Introduction
The no-arbitrage argument is a pillar of financial valuation techniques. According to this principle, cross-listed bonds should have the same value on all markets (up to effects due to the market microstructure). This note exhibits a notable historical exception which occurred during a rare conjunction of two special events: the impossibility of international arbitrage due to war restrictions and the repudiation of a sovereign bond by its issuer.
Sovereign bonds differ in some respects from corporate bonds. First, there exist no internationally agreed-upon bankruptcy procedures in case of default. Second, countries can unilaterally decide to repudiate their debt, mainly following extreme political outcomes like coups and revolutions. However, default and repudiation do not necessarily lead bond prices to drop to zero. Indeed, three potential scenarios may result in, at least partial, reimbursement.
First, since the debtor countries continue to exist after the default or repudiation announcement, political and/or economic changes can make the authorities revise earlier statements. Second, international negotiations may lead to settlements. Lastly, for internal reasons, the bondholders' governments sometimes decide to financially intervene in favor of their homeland citizens. As a matter of fact, defaulted and repudiated bonds frequently remain quoted on financial markets for quite a long period after the issuer's decision to stop the payments (Borchard and Wynne, 1951) .
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Russian Tsarist bonds were spread over several European financial bourses. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Russia had become the largest borrower in the world (Ukhov, 2003) . Liquid and convertible in various currencies,
Russian bonds were present in many investors' portfolios. In particular, and for political reasons, the French government strongly recommended them to the public after 1895.
WWI breakout forced most European markets to close. When they reopened, heavy local controls were imposed excluding de facto international arbitrage. Like other securities, the Tsarist bonds were then traded again. However, the emergence of political troubles in Russia led to a progressive price decline. The effective repudiation by the Soviets on February 8, 1918, did not change much this dynamics, probably because it was already incorporated in the agents' expectations. Eventually, on the French and British markets, the prices even rose from April, 1918 to October, 1919 After the repudiation, the bond prices, quoted with respect to the par value, were mostly higher in Paris than in London, a phenomenon which cannot be attributed to exchange rates, since currency effects were offset by the fixed parities imbedded in the bond specifications. Nevertheless, from January 6, 1916 to August 31, 1919, the war conditions imposed on the French and British markets made geographical arbitrages impossible so that investors were unable to profit from the observed price differentials.
Compared to the British investors, the French viewed the Russian bonds as more valuable. This is probably linked to the earlier French government's attitude, which had, e.g., bailed out 50% of Mexican bonds following their repudiation in 1864 (Oosterlinck, 2003 This note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the markets organization during WWI leading to the arbitrage impossibility. Section 3 presents the original database and tests for the difference between the Russian bond prices in Paris and in London, first on the complete no-arbitrage period, then on the two sub-periods lying respectively before and after the repudiation announcement. Section 4 concludes.
The French and British bourses during WWI
WW I had a dramatic impact on the functioning of the stock exchanges both in France and in Great-Britain. In order to avoid panic, the regulatory authorities first suspended the In order to prevent the collapse of the British financial system, the reopening of the 
The empirical analysis
The data series have been collected in the Amsterdam (Freymond, 1995) . Bondholders could get reimbursed at their will in Berlin, Brussels or Geneva at a fixed parity stipulated on the bonds 11 . Not surprisingly, the French and English prices lie under the nominal value during the complete period, the maximal price being, respectively, 81.5 and 83.5. The third column in Table 1 concerns the difference between the French and English quotations 12 during the full period without arbitrage possibilities. The test result shows that the mean difference is significantly different from zero (at the 1% level), indicating that the two prices diverge.
However, this result is not sufficient to detect the effect of the debt repudiation by the Soviets as a factor influencing the spread. Indeed, as arbitrage opportunities did not exist over the 8 For the London data, mid-quote prices are used. 9 Coupons were paid twice a year on January, 15, and July, 15. 10 The nominal total value traded in London in January 1917 was estimated at 55,580,000 £ (Corporation of foreign bondholders, 1919).
whole observation period, different prices of any given asset in London and Paris can reflect different expectations driven by geographical specificities.
In order to determine, to which extent the repudiation plays a role, the data has been divided into two sub-samples: the pre-repudiation observations (from January 6, 1916 to February 8, 1918 13 ) and the post-repudiation ones (from February 9, 1918 to August 31, 1919). Table 2 
Conclusion
Geographical arbitrage is a basic financial operation (buy somewhere a given asset and sell it elsewhere at the same time at a better price) requiring only a simultaneous access to two markets. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, arbitrages could easily be implemented in practice. Troubled periods, like wars and revolutions, during which the financial markets are subject to heavy constraints excluding arbitrages, are exceptional and their observation is rare. The combination of a global war and a local revolution is even more exceptional. To our knowledge, this study based on an original database provides the first 13 Since rumors regarding the repudiation were circulating before the official announcement; this date might reveal posterior to the beginning of divergences between the French and British investors' views. Nevertheless, taking any earlier date might look quite arbitrary and would reinforce the empirical conclusion. 14 See, for instance, the articles regularly published in 1919 in Le Rentier, an influencial French financial journal pleading for a governmental intervention. Further studies could investigate to which extend these findings apply to recent crises.
Historical Appendix
As repudiation rumors gained in intensity, the French government decided to guarantee the payment of the January 1918 coupon 15 . On January 31, 1918, M. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, declared that the government would also pay the February 15 Le Rentier December 27, 1917. coupons 16 . However, he insisted on the measures' temporary nature, as discussions were held in order to achieve a common allied policy. Meanwhile, many voices claimed that France had a "moral duty" regarding the reimbursement 17 . The government soon realized that paying the Russian coupons was not sustainable on the long run. The separate peace signed between Germany and Russia at Brest Litovsk provided an excuse to stop the payment. Indeed, the coupons payments officially made helped support an allied country facing momentary internal problems. In view of Russia's withdrawal from the war, the French government decided to stop servicing the Russian debt. In reaction, part of the French financial press exhorted the investors to protest 18 and during August, many believed that the French parliament would come back on its decision and pay the second semester coupons 19 . Their hopes were met to some extent when ,on September 19, 1918 the government passed a law allowing French investors to subscribe up to 50% of the new French Liberation loan by paying with the Russian coupons due from April to December 1918 20 . As late as May 30 th 1919, in a speech at the Senate, the French Finance Minister suggested to reiterate the September 1918 operation; a proposal eventually rejected by the rest of the government. A law passed on July 25, 1919 provided privileges for the French holders of Russian bonds, who were either living in the French regions devastated by WWI or had fought during the same war. They were allowed to exchange their coupons to subscribe up to 50% of French National Defense Bonds (Reynaud 1924) . This coupon exchange would be the last financial action undertaken by the French government even though there were high expectations that it would intervene again. 
